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‘None be so hardy to tell or publish any false news or tales, whereby discord, or occasion of 
discord or slander may grow between the King and his people, or the great men of the Realm’—
First Statute of Westminster, 1275 
 
A historical analysis of the regulation of propaganda and obligations on states to prevent its 
dissemination reveals competing origins of the protection (and suppression) of free expression 
in international law. The conflict between the ‘marketplace of ideas’ approach favoured by 
Western democracies and the Soviet Union’s proposed direct control of media outlets have 
indirectly contributed to both the fake news crisis and engineered polarisation via 
computational propaganda. From the troubled League of Nations to the Friendly Relations 
Declaration of 1970, several international agreements and resolutions limit state use of 
propaganda to interfere with ‘malicious intent’ in the affairs of another. Yet state and non-
state actors continually use a variety of methods to disseminate deceptive content sowing civil 
discord and damaging democracies in the process. In Europe, much of the discourse about the 
regulation of ‘fake news’ has revolved around the role of the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation and the role of platforms in preventing ‘online manipulation’. There is 
also a common perception that human rights frameworks limit states’ ability to constrain 
political speech; however, using the principle of subsidiarity as a mapping tool, a regulatory 
anomaly is revealed. There is a significant lack of regulatory oversight of actors responsible 
for, and the flow of, computational propaganda that is disseminated as deceptive political 
advertising. The article examines whether there is a right to disseminate propaganda within 
our free expression rights and focusses on the harms associated with the engineered 
polarisation that is often the objective of a computational propaganda campaign. The article 
concludes with a discussion of the implications of maintaining this status quo and some 
suggestions for plugging the regulatory holes identified. 
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The development of a coherent and comprehensive response to the ‘fake news’ crisis is at a 
crucial stage. With national and regional elections across Europe and United States (US) 
presidential and congressional elections in 2020, the continuous deployment of disinformation 
campaigns could further undermine democracy, sow further seeds of social unrest and 
manipulate voters to vote against their own rational interests. So far, the solutions proposed 
have been fragmented, compartmentalised and disparate. Recommendations for ‘interagency 
cooperation’,1 ‘holistic approaches’ across various sectors2 and additional platform regulation 
to tackle ‘online harms’ associated with digital disinformation have largely been ignored or are 
slow to be implemented.3 Rather, the European approach to preventing the dissemination of 
fake news has relied heavily on data protection law to constrain systems of advertising 
technology facilitating targeted advertising campaigns that threaten platform regulation to stem 
the tide of online disinformation.4 However, historically, propaganda has been defined as a 
form of communication sent with the objective of disrupting, manipulating, persuading, 
dissuading or misinforming recipients in a predetermined way. The communication is not 
necessarily based in factual evidence, but is intended to influence and manipulate. Although 
the European Union’s (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) empowers data 
subjects with powerful rights, in reality, these are rarely exercised. Users—the actors who 
suffer the harms associated with a propaganda campaign—have largely been left to the 
promotion of initiatives of the advertising industry5 and self-regulating platforms to reform 
their practices in such a way that any attempts at manipulation by nefarious actors is mitigated.6  
Unlike in traditional war where competing sides battle over territory, in a propaganda 
campaign, the human brain is the subject of conquest. If one is not a combatant, then one is the 
subject of an invading force. Once a combatant wins over a sufficient number of minds, they 
have the power to influence society, policy and politics, and/or sow discord and civil unrest. 
While rational choice theorises that more information should be good for users,7 limited 
attention spans and information overload hinder proper discrimination between what is real and 
what is fake. Depending on the country, between 34% (Germany) and 67% (Greece) of EU 
                                                 
* Dr M.R. Leiser is Assistant Professor of Digital Technologies at Leiden Law School in The Netherlands. This paper is based 
on a Lecture delivered in the context of the 8th Annual Cambridge International Law Conference that took place on the 20th–
21st of March 2019 at the Faculty of Law of the University of Cambridge. 
1 European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), ‘EDPS Opinion on Online Manipulation and Personal Data’ (19 March 2018) 
Opinion 3/2018, 19 <https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/18-03-19_online_manipulation_en.pdf> accessed 
9 May 2019. 
2 Annina Claesson, ‘Coming Together to Fight Fake News: Lessons from the European Approach to Disinformation’ (2019) 
17 New Perspectives in Foreign Policy 13, 16 <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/NewPerspectives_APRIL2019_Claesson.pdf> accessed 5 June 2019; Commission, A Multi-dimensional Approach to 
Disinformation: Report of the Independent High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (European 
Commission, Luxembourg, 2018) 20–21; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1970 (2014), ‘Internet and 
Politics: The Impact of New Information and Communication Technology on Democracy’ (29 January 2014), para 19 
<http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=20447&lang=e> accessed 30 May 2019; Digital, 
Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Final Report (HC 2017–19, 1791) 10–11. 
3 See for example, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Online Harms (White Paper, CP 57, 2019) 6. 
4 See for example, the actions of the French Data Protection Agency, CNIL; since the General Data Protection Regulation 
came into force in May 2018, CNIL has issued four public formal notices against actors involved in the advertising business: 
see ‘Applications mobiles : mises en demeure pour absence de consentement au traitement de données de géolocalisation à 
des fins de ciblage publicitaire’ [‘Mobile Applications: Formal Notice for Lack of Consent to the Processing of Geolocation 
Data for Advertising Targeting Purposes’] (CNIL, 19 July 2018) <https://www.cnil.fr/fr/applications-mobiles-mises-en-
demeure-absence-de-consentement-geolocalisation-ciblage-publicitaire> accessed 18 July 2019. Google is also facing its first 
investigation by the European lead authority for ‘suspected infringement’ of the GDPR: ‘Data Protection Commission Opens 
Statutory Inquiry into Google Ireland Limited’ (Data Protection Commission, 22 May 2019) 
<https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/data-protection-commission-opens-statutory-inquiry-google-
ireland-limited> accessed 5 June 2019. 
5 ‘Advertising Industry Response to the European Commission Public Consultation on Fake News and Online Disinformation’ 
(23 February 2018) <https://eaca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Fake-News_Advertising-Industry_Position-
Paper_Final.pdf> accessed 5 June 2019. 
6 Casey Newton, ‘Facebook is Regulating its Products Before Lawmakers Force Them To’ (The Verge, 12 April 2019) 
<https://www.theverge.com/interface/2019/4/12/18307091/facebook-integrity-updates-remove-reduce-inform-groups> 
accessed 5 June 2019.  
7 For a discussion of rational choice in the context of digital media, see Mark Leiser, ‘The Problem with “Dots”: Questioning 
the Role of Rationality in the Online Environment’ (2016) 30 International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 191. 
citizens follow news on social media,8 six out of ten shared news items are passed on by 
individual users without reading them first,9 a Channel Four study showed how only four per 
cent of individuals were able to identify fake news, and even digital-savvy students have 
difficulties discriminating fake news from real.10 Viral election news stories outperformed real 
news across Facebook11 as falsehoods spread farther, faster, deeper and more broadly than the 
truth. Although bots play a significant role in the spread of fake news, it is believable more 
than the truth because of the frailty of humans. False news ‘spreads more than the truth because 
humans, not robots, are more likely to spread it’.12 Many of the ideas within propaganda are 
conspiracy theories that prompt a decline in the acceptance of science and pro-social 
behaviour.13 These have contributed to fractures in contemporary society.  
With persistent ideological debates about the role of platforms in the recent upheaval of 
society, normative claims about platforms as individualised self-regulating marketplaces 
functioning to drive ‘bad ideas’ out are no longer accepted as fact.14 On the one hand, there is 
an argument that social media sites like Facebook and Twitter should be treated (therefore, 
protected) like they are part of the public sphere: they contribute to the marketplace of ideas 
and should be regulated (or not) in their role, as such. Conversely, the use of a variety of 
automated processes to disseminate content that benefit Facebook’s bottom line ensure there is 
very little uniformity about the type of content users are exposed to. Contrary to much of the 
public discourse, users are rarely to blame for the dissemination of fake news. According to 
Guess et al, although users over 65 shared nearly seven times as many articles from fake news 
domains as the youngest age group, 90% of all respondents in the research study shared no 
stories from fake news domains and only 8.5% of users shared at least one article to their 
friends.15 
For those keeping score, those advocating for more regulation of the automated processes 
used by social media platforms appear to have won the ideological battle. The European 
Commission has emphasised the need for a coherent strategy for the removal of illegal content16 
and the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport of the United Kingdom (UK) has 
gone further, publishing a proposal that calls for a ‘duty of care’ to prevent ‘online harms’.17 
Under the auspices of an independent regulator, platforms will likely deploy artificial 
intelligence and a variety of monitoring techniques to scan the volumes of user-generated 
content uploaded daily to scan for disinformation.18 Rather than regulate a) actors that deploy 
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(advertisers), b) content (advertisements), or c) the processes used to target users (psychometric 
profiling and targeted advertising), the EU has opted for shifting the administrative burden and 
responsibility for users onto platforms. Failing to regulate computational propaganda is a 
failure of regulators in the fight for the protection of democracy.  
Therefore, this article is structured as follows: first, it traces the foundation of the 
fundamental right to free expression to state obligations in international law not to disseminate 
propaganda. Because of the value given to the marketplace of ideas in Western democracies, 
the next section examines whether there is a right to disseminate propaganda in contemporary 
society. The next section argues that the lack of a coherent definition for ‘fake news’ has 
contributed to difficulties developing a coherent strategy for stemming the tide of its 
dissemination before moving to a critique of one of the methods used by actors that spread 
deceptive communications via Facebook’s platform. A brief examination is posited of how the 
EU’s system-based approach to mitigating the harms associated with online misinformation 
contributes to engineering of polarisation associated with computational propaganda. Finally, 
the article uses the principle of subsidiarity to identify the appropriate actors for the regulation 
of computational propaganda and identifies areas where regulatory reform is needed.  
 
2 REGULATING INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA 
 
In October 2018, Twitter released a dataset of content posted on its service identified as part of 
foreign influence operations, in particular coming from an infamous Russian company, the 
Internet Research Agency (IRA).19 The volume of released data was an astounding 275 GB. 
The move by the microblogging platform mirrored an earlier release by Facebook following 
the 2016 US election cycle after the discovery of disinformation operations taking place on its 
platform.20 Both platforms made data available to researchers to help understand what 
techniques were successfully used to drive activism and engagement. A transatlantic research 
lab concluded that more than 2 million images, GIFs, videos and broadcasts were targeted at 
communities to engineer polarisation to influence public discourse and elections.21 On this side 
of the Atlantic, Howard and Kollanyi determined that a statistically insignificant number of 
political bots, small pieces of software designed to undertake an automated task, generated a 
disproportionate amount of messages during the UK’s referendum on continued membership 
of the EU.22 Sanovich convincingly argues that although Russia has historically sought to 
capitalise on existing divisions between the political left and right, the inability of her state-
controlled broadcast media23 to influence the Western world is partly responsible for the 
adoption of bots and trolls as key propaganda tools deployed by Russian actors like the IRA.  
The obligation on states not to disseminate propaganda—hostile communications about 
one state sent across international borders—has been part of customary law since the French 
Revolution. Van Dyke could only identify one instance, a treaty in the late 1860s between 
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Greece and Serbia to target Turkey with propaganda, that expressly contravened the custom 
not to broadcast propaganda into another state’s territory.24 Finding consensus on the 
attribution of responsibility for private propaganda is far more challenging. As early as 1802, 
when Napoleon declared that it is a ‘general maxim of [international law]’ that states are bound 
to suppress private propaganda and punish those who purvey it, the UK rejected this 
interpretation of international law.25 Although Belgium passed laws making private activities 
against foreign governments a crime, when Bismarck complained about private propaganda, 
the Belgian government rejected that any state responsibility doctrine existed.26 Other states 
chose to adopt measures that imposed responsibility on the state for private propaganda. The 
Carlsbad Decrees of the Germanic Confederation of 1819, the Treaty of Amiens of 1801 and 
the Austro–Serbian Convention of 1881 all imposed state responsibility for private propaganda 
activities. Others tried to control it, but did not impose state responsibility, leaving customary 
law consistently violated and in a state of confusion. 
Any attempt to regulate propaganda by private actors has been frustrated by not only 
advances in technology, but the development of mechanisms that facilitate its dissemination 
across territorial borders. Unsurprisingly, attempts to regulate private actor propaganda failed 
to take into account advances in technology. Many of the international agreements that 
facilitated communications from one state to another at the start of the 20th century contained 
clauses permitting one state to refuse delivery of messages. However, these clauses were 
limited to messages deemed to be ‘dangerous to the peace and security of the country’.27  
Early attempts to regulate propaganda first drew on neutrality law28 before states started 
inserting anti-propaganda clauses into bilateral agreements of friendship and non-aggression in 
the 1920s and 1930s.29 In 1936, the League of Nations sponsored the first multilateral 
peacetime anti-propaganda effort. Signatories of the Convention Concerning the Use of 
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace (the Treaty) were required to prohibit the use of 
broadcasting for propaganda or the spreading of false news by both state and private actors.30 
Both, the UK, which favoured non-interference in matters of the press, and the Soviet Union, 
which supported government-enforced regulation and/or complete monopolisation of the press, 
signed the Treaty. Like the League of Nations, the Treaty was fraught with trouble and states 
immediately took steps to control information entering their territory. The Soviets reserved the 
right to jam radio broadcasts and Spain reserved the right to put a stop to all propaganda liable 
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to ‘affect internal order’. States established controls for licensing broadcasting facilities and 
began eliminating clandestine radio stations.31 
In part because of a lack of any enforcement mechanism, and in part because the 
Treaty’s noble attempt to promote ‘mutual understanding between States’ failed so miserably 
during World War II and ‘propaganda liberally fuelled the hostilities’,32 the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) took up the question of how to regulate subversive and defamatory 
propaganda in its first ever assembly.33 Noting the dire consequences associated with 
propaganda used by the German and Italian governments in the run-up to and during the war, 
the UNGA acknowledged the need to regulate freedom of information to prevent its abuse with 
‘malicious intent’.34 Extensive debate ensued with countries like the UK and the US ‘generally 
favouring the marketplace of ideas populated by the free flow of information to correct 
inaccuracies’, whereas the Soviet Union and her allies supported government responsibility 
for, if not control of, the media.35 The Draft Convention on Freedom of Information also 
affirmed the ‘right to listen’ and ‘declared no other grounds other than military security existed 
for peacetime censorship over the international transmission of news material’.36 
The text sent to the General Assembly forms the basis of article 19 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR or Covenant),37 article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)38 and article 11 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.39 The qualifications found in the text of the Draft Covenant all but ignore propaganda. 
The US, in particular, did not want any text in the United Nations (UN) Charter to empower 
states to limit free expression, but did manage to find agreement with the Soviets who wanted 
an article that authorised the regulation of any information qualifying as propaganda. In the 
end, both sides agreed to let article 26 of the Draft Covenant regulate state propaganda, but 
limited its application to propaganda for war or any advocacy of violence that constitutes 
incitement to discriminate, hostility or violence.40 For the US, any regulation of propaganda 
would conflict with freedom of expression and rights to impart and access information. 
Although US representatives approved article 19, the US did not ratify the ICCPR until 1992, 
in large part because of the limitations on communications found in article 19 and article 20. 
Downey argues that this made the US position somewhat difficult to explain: ‘first the United 
States seemed willing to accept a compromise on its freedom of information position, and then 
                                                 
31 Charles G Fenwick, ‘The Third Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Rio de Janeiro’ (1942) 36 AJIL 169, 174, 189.  
32 Downey (n 27) 345.  
33 The UNGA adopted Resolution 59 (I) titled ‘Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information’: UNGA 
Res 59 (I) (14 December 1946) UN Doc A/RES/59. The Economic and Social Council sponsored the International Conference 
on Freedom of Information at Geneva in 1948 to study the measures for counteracting the persistent spreading of demonstrably 
false or tendentious reports which confuse the peoples of the world, aggravate relations between nations or otherwise interfere 
with the growth of international understanding, peace and security against a recurrence of Nazi, Fascist or Japanese aggression: 
ECOSOC, ‘Freedom of Information: A Report on Contemporary Problems and Developments, With Recommendations For 
Practical Action, Submitted by Salvador P López to the Economic and Social Council’ (6 May 1953) UN Doc E/2426, 7.  
34 UNGA Res 59 (I) (14 December 1946) UN Doc A/RES/59, preambular para 3. 
35 Downey (n 27) 345. 
36 Ibid 346, citing UNGA, ‘Draft Convention on Freedom of Information: Note by the Secretary-General’ (1963) UN Doc 
A/5443; see also UNGA ‘Draft Convention on Freedom of Information: Note by the Secretary-General’ (1967) UN Doc 
A/6658, Annex I. 
37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171, art 19. 
38 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as 
amended), art 10. 
39 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (adopted 2 October 2000, entered into force 7 December 2000) 
2012/C 326/02 (CFR), art 11. 
40 Article 26 was drafted with the intention of being placed immediately after article 19, so when the ICCPR was adopted in 
1966, it became article 20. The text of article 20 of the ICCPR is identical to article 26 of the Draft Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. See UNGA, ‘Draft International Covenants on Human Rights: Note of the Secretary-General’ (1966) UN Doc 
A/6342, Annex I, 19. 
it rejected that compromise’.41 As a consequence, propaganda aimed at peaceful regime change 
is not covered by the prohibition of subversive propaganda under current international law.42 
Furthermore, the West wanted access to information from behind the Iron Curtain. In the battle 
of competing ideologies for the control of expression, the West won and freedom from 
interference by states was affirmed as a fundamental right.43 The use of propaganda as a 
weapon for disseminating disruptive speech is fundamental to understanding the rights-based 
frameworks for the protection of free speech we use today. Conflicting historical approaches 
to free speech in international law are rooted in attempts to regulate propaganda.44  
 
3 IS THERE A RIGHT TO PROPAGANDA? 
 
Freedom of expression is vital for the functioning of a modern and deliberative democracy; 
accordingly, any restrictions on speech is an affront to the Protagorean concept that the best 
way to protect free speech is to ensure a robust ‘marketplace of ideas’.45 Advocates of the 
adversarial system practised at common law argue that a free trade in ideas advances the search 
for truth. This school of thought believes that ‘[w]hen false ideas are expressed by some 
citizens, the best response is not sanction by the state but vigorous rebuttal by other citizens’.46 
Another school emphasises the need for free and unrestricted speech to exercise one’s personal 
autonomy,47 arguing that free speech is a necessary precondition for not only discovering 
truth,48 but self-expression.49 This school believes that individuals not only have the right to 
receive information uncensored by the state, ‘they have the right to form their own beliefs and 
express them to others’ and ‘state suppression of speech therefore violates the “sanctity of 
individual choice” and is an affront to the dignity of the individual’.50 Each of these theories of 
speech are reflected in the purposes of article 10 of the ECHR to ensure that the public has 
access to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinion and comment, reflecting, 
inter alia, the diversity of political outlook within the country and, furthermore, that journalists 
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and other professionals working in audio-visual media should be free from state interference 
in imparting this information and comment.51 
In Western democracies, any laws aiming to control the dissemination and content of speech 
could be frustrated by states’ adherence to the very rights-based frameworks for the protection 
of free expression created in the 1950s. Before considering what can and should be done to 
control the dissemination of propaganda, it is necessary to establish the legality of the measure. 
Any national or regional speech regulation passed to regulate the dissemination of propaganda 
is constrained, in part, by international or domestic guarantees of freedom of expression.52 
There are also a number of more specific provisions targeting particular types of speech.53 In 
the UK, section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (which gives effect to article 10 ECHR) 
specifically emphasises the importance of freedom of expression. Although article 10 imposes 
positive duties on states, section 4 of the Human Rights Act leaves scope for the UK Parliament 
to legislate in such a way that infringes article 10, providing it makes its intention to do so 
absolutely clear, even though this would then entail a breach of its international obligations.  
If propaganda does not receive heightened protection by virtue of this provision then as long 
as the regulation does not come in the form of primary legislation, state controls will be subject 
to less intensive forms of judicial review, such as an assessment of the reasonableness of the 
measure in question. If, however, propaganda is considered protected expression, we have then 
to ask on what grounds, if any, it can be restricted through proportionate regulation and the 
value to be ascribed to its protection? On the one hand, our expression frameworks work to 
ensure journalists’ freedom of expression on the internet, while, on the other, states’ margin of 
appreciation legitimises the general obligation placed on the media to disseminate only 
accurate information. This obligation has always been restricted in application to broadcast 
media, but considering the structural decline of traditional, legacy media, this principle could 
be applied to platforms. The question is what methods of disseminating computational 
propaganda can be regulated and how.  
 
4 FROM ‘FAKE NEWS’ TO ‘COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA’ 
 
With propaganda from public and private actors unlikely to abide any time soon,54 and no 
coherent legal framework to hold states responsible, the West has opted to adopt a variety of 
measures intended to protect the marketplace of ideas during democratic events from external 
interference. To thwart deceptive content designed to affect turnout or influence results, 
hackers from the US Cyber Command—described as a more autonomous and aggressive 
agency than its sibling the National Security Agency—took Russia’s Internet Research Agency 
offline during the US congressional midterm elections.55 At the other end of the spectrum, the 
EU formed the East StratCom Task Force to analyse, debunk and publish ‘fake news’ stories.56 
                                                 
51 Manole and others v Moldova App no 13936/02 (ECtHR, 17 September 2009), para 100.  
52 ICCPR, art 19; ECHR, art 10; CFR, art 11. 
53 For instance, the prohibition in article 20 of the ICCPR on propaganda for war and the advocacy of certain forms of hatred 
that constitutes an incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. These concerns also find reflection in specific treaties, 
such as the Council of Europe Framework Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Cybercrime Convention) (opened for 
signature 23 November 2001, entered into force 1 July 2004) ETS 185. 
54 Samuel C Woolley and Philip N Howard, ‘Computational Propaganda Worldwide: Executive Summary’ (2017) Oxford 
Computational Propaganda Research Project Working Paper No 2017.11, 10–11 <http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Casestudies-ExecutiveSummary.pdf> accessed 10 June 2019.  
55 Ellen Nakashima, ‘US Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian Troll Factory on Day of 2018 
Midterms’ (The Washington Post, 27 February 2019) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-
command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-
11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2c0305ff5860> accessed 8 June 2019.  
56 ‘Don’t Be Deceived: EU Acts Against Fake News and Disinformation’ (European Union External Action, 19 September 
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Beyond exposing ‘fake news’ stories, a self-regulatory EU-wide Code of Practice on 
Disinformation created for platforms and advertisers required signatories to delete fake 
accounts, label messages by bots, cooperate with fact-checkers and researchers to detect 
disinformation and to make fact-checked content more visible.57 Bernal, unconvinced by 
D’Ancona’s definition (‘the deliberate presentation of falsehood as fact’) refers to ‘fake news’ 
as ‘falsehoods presenting themselves as both “real” and “news”, in the sense that they are new, 
relevant, and important enough to be “newsworthy”.’58 As the threshold of ‘newsworthy’ has 
not been reached, Bernal’s narrow definition would not cover, for example, fake news claiming 
the earth was flat—no credible journalist would attach their name to this type of unsubstantiated 
claim; however, evidence-based accounts of people believing in this type of conspiracy theory 
would be considered newsworthy and ‘real’ under this definition. As Bernal’s emphasis is on 
the harms associated with ‘fake narratives’, he downplays the role of custom advertising, dark 
posts,59 organised trolling and visual memes.60 
Informed by research from cognitive and social psychology, ‘fake news’ may be 
defined as a deceptive form of media transmission and/or publishing that seeks to take 
advantage of our cognitive biases and errors in judgement to advance a commercial or political 
agenda.61 Drawing from a criminal law schema, it covers media transmissions that advance a 
commercial or political agenda (actus reus) and an intention to deceive (mens rea).62 This 
definition does not properly recognise the propagator’s varied objectives or actors that 
innocently spread fake news, nor does it properly address the different methods used to 
disseminate deceptive content. Therefore, a refined definition can be posited: ‘fake news’ is a 
deceptive form of authentic-looking content, publishing or advertising that seeks to take 
advantage of our cognitive biases63 and errors in judgement to advance a commercial or 
political agenda. Its creator does not submit to content regulation.64 This broader definition not 
only integrates advertising and publishing into the definition, but also recognises three 
challenges in regulating fake news: first, the accidental inclusion of satirical sites that use 
‘humour, irony, exaggeration or ridicule to expose and criticise prevailing immorality or 
foolishness’;65 second, the fact that creators of ‘fake news’, including state actors, rely on 
legacy protections for ensuring the fundamental right to political expression is given utmost 
consideration;66 and finally, it ensures that the distribution of advertising via automated systems 
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that facilitate the purchasing, delivery and optimisation of advertisements67 are captured 
alongside more personalised marketing campaigns that use ‘custom audiences’ mechanisms to 
target delivery.68 
The European Data Protection Board has proposed further ‘interagency cooperation’ to 
address the spread of ‘deliberate disinformation’.69 The European Data Protection Supervisor 
refers to online disinformation as ‘managed content display’ presented as most relevant for 
users but ordered to maximise revenue for the platform.70 The European Commission’s 
independent High Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation (HLEG) took 
a different approach, putting the term ‘fake news’ in a silo in favour of ‘online disinformation’ 
to legitimise discussions about the system of advertising techniques used to spread deceptive 
content.71 However, its definition, ‘all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information 
designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit’72 contains 
three high, but problematic, thresholds: first, ‘public harm’ and ‘profit’ confusingly mix motive 
with the effects on society. On their own, the targeted advertisements or dark posts discussed 
below would almost never qualify as satisfying the ‘public harm’ or ‘profit’ threshold. 
Secondly, the HLEG expressly states defamation is excluded from its definition. Yet some of 
the most infamous examples of fake news are textbook examples of libellous content.73 
Although politicians are the least likely to exercise their right to protect their reputation under 
EU and national law, that does not mean that defamatory content is not deceptive. 
It would be fair to say that disparate terminology has contributed to the bastardisation 
of the term, ‘fake news’. Tambini convincingly argues that the term ‘fake news’ is so spoiled 
that the only responsible way to understand it is to first identify the beneficiaries of the term. 
Politicians and new populists, for example, deploy ‘fake news’ to undermine legitimate 
opposition and to resist fourth estate accountability. Historical losers use the term to claim that 
a result could only happen due to misinformation with some actors on the wrong end of an 
outcome arguing that electoral results are no longer legitimate due to ‘fake news’. The term 
has also been used by mainstream media to discredit the ‘wisdom of crowds’ to drive a return 
of readers back to trusted news brands.74 With so many disparate approaches to regulating 
deceptive content and so much at stake, what can international law contribute, if anything, to 
the protection of the information ecosystem and democratic values of deliberation and 
pluralism? 
Could the historical regulation of propaganda inform our understanding of ‘fake news’, 
‘disinformation’, ‘online manipulation’ etc.? ‘Propaganda’ is a transmission across 
international borders that has the objective of disrupting, manipulating, persuading, dissuading 
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or misinforming recipients in a predetermined way. The communication is not necessarily 
based on factual evidence but has the intention to influence and manipulate. There are also 
clear similarities between a term like ‘fake news’ and the third world’s use of the term ‘false 
reports’ to describe propaganda. However, propaganda is too analogue for the digitised world 
in which we live. Adding the word ‘computational’ does not just refer to the method of 
dissemination. It specifically acknowledges the role digital technologies have in adding levels 
of efficiency and scale to a propaganda campaign.  
 
5 ENGINEERING POLARISATION VIA COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA 
 
The harms associated with computational propaganda are only beginning to be understood. 
Lewandowsky argues that misinformation contributes to suboptimal decisions by an ill-
informed society.75 The types of disinformation within a computational propaganda campaign 
have contributed to everything from public health crises76 to a rise in climate change 
scepticism.77 More broadly, misinformation causes people to stop believing in facts78 and 
reduces trust in official information, as well as government services and institutions.79 If users 
are only responsible for limited dissemination of deceptive content, and the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation is meant to regulate the system of processing required for dissemination, 
then how does computational propaganda get into the information ecosystem? 
When a propagandist wants to start a campaign, they can take advantage of the lack of 
regulatory oversight of political advertising in the UK and Facebook’s automated content 
approval systems. The systematic abuse of both by Russian trolls resulted in thousands of 
promoted ads reaching an estimated 11.4 million people and 80,000 ‘organic’ posts reaching 
126 million users.80 The aim is to disrupt social cohesion and sow dissent in order to advance 
‘Putinism’—an ideology that advances Russian sovereignty while attacking the liberal and 
multilateral ideals of the West.81 Propaganda campaigns to influence the outcome of the 2016 
US presidential election and the referendum of the UK’s continued membership in the EU are 
not anomalies. Russian agents have been conducting computational propaganda operations on 
social media platforms for several years in many countries around the world.82 
Youyou, Kosinski and Stillwell showed that a computer algorithm could infer people’s 
personality on the basis of just ten Facebook likes more accurately than human work 
colleagues.83 This success rate increased with the number of likes and the program 
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outperformed people’s spouses—the best available human judges—when it had access to 300 
likes. The more-than-one-billion Facebook users worldwide reveal much about their 
personality, whether they like it or not.84 The effects—and ethics—of such micro-targeting of 
advertising remain to be fully understood, but the current ‘disruption in democratic 
governance’ has been squarely linked to social media.85 
Not only does psychometric testing, affinity/group profiling and automated/algorithmic 
dissemination contribute to the efficiency of behavioural and targeted advertising, dark posts 
sent to custom audiences via the advertising technology commonly found on social media 
platforms all contribute to the engineered polarisation that is often the objective of a 
computational propaganda campaign. A deceptive propagator has several methods at their 
disposal for the dissemination of content designed to influence and manipulate voters. Due to 
the complexity and variety, a campaign is usually undertaken using some form of automated 
process designed for disseminating content. For example, psychometric profiling86 and targeted 
advertising use personal data gathered from an array of data brokers and gatekeepers.87 That 
data is subsequently analysed and certain personality traits are attributed to specific users.88 
These are used as the basis of a campaign, with political ads and fake news stories based on the 
user’s psychological attributes and emotional responses to testing stimuli, targeted at users. 
User engagement can be measured, fed back into learning models and redeployed to gain 
further insights about how to algorithmically trigger users of a certain political disposition into 
making a non-rational political decision. Research has shown targeted ads mobilise especially 
young voters in competitive districts, yet with a small impact (less than 2% of voters are 
affected).89 In an ever-polarised world, not only does computational propaganda divide society, 
it mobilises society in a way that can impact elections. Groups also tend to harden their views 
over time, becoming even more resilient to alternative and moderating opinions. 
Marketers and profilers directed dark posts, a form of social media advertisement, at 
custom audiences. Unlike other forms of Facebook marketing, dark (unpublished) posts are 
only visible to the target. However, Facebook’s ad manager integrated ‘shares’ and ‘likes’ 
across multiple custom advertisements. This means that 100 custom advertisements could be 
delivered to 100 different target groups. Unique advertisements, visible in some cases to only 
one user, appeared to be far more popular than they were. Facebook’s ads manager integrated 
the engagement across all 100 ads making political marketing messages appear far more 
popular than they were.90 By integrating user engagement from unique ads, Facebook 
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effectively permitted advertisers to use AstroTurfing techniques (a deceptive and illegal form 
of marketing that fools users into thinking that popularity is organic when, in reality, the 
support is artificial91) to manipulate its own users. There is evidence that social pressure can 
mobilise or depress voter turnout,92 and that social movements can mobilise quickly with little 
organisational structure. These can have turbulent outcomes and unpredictable results, 
including social upheaval. Lewandowsky et al argue that disinformation can also violate the 
public’s right to be informed about risk.93 The micro-targeting of computational propaganda 
can also tip the balance of power between power brokers. Richer parties can buy more data, 
hire better data analysts and designers, and outbid poorer parties at the auction for possible 
voters. 
The most infamous example comes from the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal.94 
Facebook’s internal report into malicious use of its platform identified targeted data collection, 
content creation and false amplification as three major features of online information 
operations.95 By gathering information about which specific social causes users had previously 
shown an interest in, Facebook ads were targeted via direct dark posts at custom audiences. In 
some cases, individualised ads were only visible to single users as part of a campaign that 
measured their success. Several companies aggregate and maintain databases of sensitive 
behavioural data on billions of people and use that data to influence and reinforce existing 
biases and systematic errors we make when making decisions. These campaigns are designed 
based on data-drive predictive analytics, personalisation and, most importantly, A/B testing in 
order to influence behaviour on an unprecedented scale. For example, the Trump campaign ran 
A/B testing to determine which ad variations outperformed others, with the campaign 
ultimately generating ‘100,000 distinct pieces of creative content’ before they rolled ‘out the 
strongest performers to broader audiences’.96  
Often, automated campaigns are based on complex algorithms that can predict our political 
leanings, identify and target opposition voters for harassment or doxing, direct political 
advertising toward or to drown out opposition, validate fringe voters by making them appear 
more mainstream and ‘acceptable’, and direct unregulated political advertising en masse.97 All 
of this data is then fed back into the advertising ecosystem using instant personalisation and 
predictive marketing with almost no oversight from the platform providers. Thus, propagators 
can pair decision data with algorithmic processing for provocative advertising campaigns; for 
example, Russian operatives buying ads in order to influence the US election98 or to stir up 
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racial tensions after the deadliest mass shooting in US history.99 When an ad is unattributed to 
an identifiable advocate, but is also salient to the target recipient, the lack of transparency 
associated with computational propaganda generates polarisation of beliefs. Kahan et al have 
shown when such arguments are attributed to identifiable advocates, the impact of arguments 
on subjects is highly sensitive to the perceived cultural outlooks of the advocates. When 
persons of diverse cultural outlooks observe an advocate whose values they share advancing 
an argument they are predisposed to accept, and an advocate whose values they reject 
advancing an argument they are predisposed to resist, the usual association between persons’ 
cultural world-views and their positions becomes more extreme.100 
 
6 SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE AND THE REGULATION OF COMPUTATIONAL 
PROPAGANDA 
 
Any regulation of commercial and political speech rightly prompts queries about the 
infringement of expression rights. Despite speech protection at the forefront of democratic 
ideals, our society is not very protectionist when it comes to deceptive practices and demands 
substantial regulatory oversight of commercial advertising. We have strong frameworks for 
protecting consumers and take steps to ensure that citizens and outsiders alike do not skewer 
the integrity of political discourse. In April 2018, the EU Commission released a 
Communication on Disinformation arguing that the ‘primary obligation of state actors in 
relation to freedom of expression and media freedom is to refrain from interference and 
censorship and to ensure a favourable environment for inclusive and pluralistic debate’.101 
However, the principle of subsidiarity provides the legal justification for taking proportional 
measures to restrict fundamental rights. The national authorities are generally in a better 
position than the supervisory bodies to strike the right balance between the sometimes 
conflicting interests of the Community and the protection of the fundamental rights of the 
individual.102 The principle of subsidiarity respects both the need for uniform and harmonious 
rules across the EU and member states’ demands for greater recognition of autonomy. It is 
referred to as ‘the most important of the principles underlying the convention’103 and reflects a 
‘distribution of powers between the supervisory machinery and the national authorities which 
has necessarily to be weighted in favour of the latter’.104  
At its heart, the principle recognises social organisation and presupposes the existence 
of certain social groups. Furthermore, it also developed as a response to excessive 
individualism in a way that permits a higher authority to intervene to the extent to which the 
lower authority (or the individual) has shown or proved incapable, and sets out the parameters 
for when it is appropriate for the higher authority to intervene. The former president of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Dean Spielmann, has suggested that the ECtHR in 
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Animal Defenders International made clear how the principle will be applied: ‘Where 
[national] legislators carefully weigh up the relevant human rights aspects of a piece of 
legislation, and seek to achieve a reasonable accommodation between individual rights and 
other aspects of public interest, the Court has shown itself inclined to accept the balance that 
has been struck’.105 
The principle of subsidiarity is vital for protecting Convention rights: proper and 
efficient application of Convention obligations may restrain interference by European courts. 
The concept of subsidiarity conveys adherence to a political philosophy that puts the individual 
at the heart of social organisation. It is therefore not appropriate to view subsidiarity through 
the lens of society, but as a principle governing the organisation of society. As Millon-Delsol 
states: ‘the question of the type of system comes after the question of the extent of government 
powers’.106 At its most rudimentary level, subsidiarity encapsulates the idea that political power 
should intervene only when society’s organs, from the individual to the family, the local 
community and various larger groupings have not been able to resolve the issue on their own. 
When a propagandist exercises their extreme individualistic right to create content that 
deceives, manipulates and harms other users, and that interferes with democratic deliberation 
and/or the information ecosystem, subsidiarity permits an authority’s interference with one of 
the fundamental premises of the marketplace subjectivists’ school of free expression: that there 
is no ‘objective truth’ and all opinions should be heard leaving the public to decide the most 
convincing. Thus, regulatory interference with free expression can be undertaken by national 
authorities. Furthermore, the European courts will only act as the arbiter of the ‘balancing 
exercise’ when deciding if rights have been infringed. Subsidiarity is not only vital for 
protecting Convention rights: proper and efficient application of Convention obligations may 
restrain interference by European courts, and the principle facilitates standard setting across 
member states with European judges learning from a variety of domestic contexts. Thus, 
subsidiarity permits national authorities to regulate against norms and to limit rights when the 




In order to ensure transparency and that our democratic processes are not hijacked by those 
with the best technology, regulation of the advertising eco-system must be updated to reflect 
the scale of computational propaganda. Sometimes lawmakers rush to pass ‘new’ laws, labels 
and liabilities to fix what are perceived as novel problems posed by digital technologies. 
However, these remedies often come at the expense of the expertise and knowledge of existing 
regulators already in place. Rather than reclassifying platforms as something new or in between 
a platform and a publisher,107 regulators should be encouraged to develop trusted ‘principle’-
based reforms to the regulation of political advertising underpinned by adherence to human 
rights frameworks. 
At present, regulatory agencies that typically handle deceptive advertising generally 
refer claims of a political nature on to the UK’s Electoral Commission where there is an 
understandable reluctance to interfere with political speech. Yet computational propaganda 
operates via an algorithmic output, rather than a human voice. They should be characterised by 
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the organs of the state tasked with regulating commercial speech and advertising as a deceptive 
communications. One of the reasons the Advertising Standards Agency (ASA) has legitimacy 
to regulate commercial speech is the consensus among commercial companies to be regulated. 
In addition to stifling democratic deliberation, one of the reasons that we have not regulated 
political speech is that there was no consensus among the participants for regulation.108 
Following the 1997 general election, the ASA avoided any regulatory oversight of political 
advertising, arguing that it might damage the advertising industry’s self-regulatory system if it 
were seen to have been deployed against one political party but not another.109 It also felt unable 
to rule sufficiently quickly to affect an election campaign. Presently, its Codes of Practice 
completely exempt political advertising.110 Furthermore, there is the practical side of 
regulating: asking Macedonian teenagers to sign-up to a voluntary code of practice or Russian 
trolls to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts in England and Wales would be an exercise in 
futility. 
In response to numerous measures by the EU Commission and demands from national 
lawmakers to increase transparency and accountability, platforms agreed to a voluntary code 
of ‘self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation’ that aim to increase ‘transparency in 
political advertising’, close ‘fake accounts’ and demonetise financial incentives associated with 
the dissemination of disinformation.111 Platforms undertook initiatives to increase transparency 
and accountability. Facebook has implemented an authorisation procedure for all political and 
issue-based advertising and requires a ‘paid-for’ disclaimer on all ads.112 However, this is 
limited to specific electoral events. Facebook’s new public repository permits users to see the 
number of political- and issue-based ads that were run in EU member states, along with 
information like aggregate advertiser expenditure and pages running each ad.113 Regulators, 
watchdogs and media will be able to take advantage of expanded access to Facebook’s 
Application Programming Interface (API) to help increase accountability.  
The repository is seen as a tool to be used by competing political advertisers to help 
offset the damage associated with psychometric targeting. The application of the ‘marketplace 
of ideas’ ideology to the advertising ecosystem is problematic for a number of reasons. Political 
advertisements in the ‘offline world’ are attempts to influence voters into making some sort of 
decision. Broadcast political advertisements are educative and informative in nature; for 
example, an ad designed to explain a candidate’s position on an issue (ie pro-life, anti-tax, pro-
green policies) or an attempt to convey a certain characteristic about the voter to the candidate 
(ie strong religious background, strong on national security, ‘faith and family’ etc). 
Transparency in broadcast political advertisements facilitate rebuttal by the other side. There 
are also significant financial constraints on how many political ads can be purchased via the 
medium of broadcasting in an election cycle, but little online. Market constraints ensure that 
the people producing content for broadcasting restrict the number of actors producing political 
content to those who have vested interests in ensuring that they comply with codes.  
Regulating platform providers may be one solution to ensure the legitimacy of our 
democratic institutions and processes but it may be more appropriate to either use or change 
existing laws to achieve the same regulatory outcome. For example, take the US and the UK’s 
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historical approach to regulating political advertising. The US approach focuses on ensuring 
that each side in national, state and local elections remains aware of what their opposition is 
saying. This is reflected in their ‘market rebuttal’ approach to democratic deliberation.114 The 
UK approach focuses on financial transparency, general/national election expenditure rules 
mandating specific limits on contributions. Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code mandates a general 
prohibition on television advertisements, leaving parties allocated blocks of free airtime for 
party political broadcasts, which are labelled party election broadcasts during official campaign 
periods.115 Both the US and the UK approaches, by very different means, are designed to 
ultimately ensure that foreign states do not interfere with an individual’s internal democratic 
deliberation. To achieve this means sensible and proactive restrictions on the right to free 
speech. 
The ECtHR has stated that in the period before or during an election, it may be 
considered necessary ‘to place certain restrictions, of a type which would not usually be 
acceptable, on freedom of expression’ in order to secure the ‘free expression of the opinion of 
the people in the choice of the legislature’.116 In many instances, this may mean that additional 
regulation is imposed on traditional media outlets but, to date, none of the same restrictions 
apply to online media and social media platforms, arguably permitting deceptive practices to 
flourish during ‘online political campaigns’.117 Yet, during the UK Parliamentary elections in 
2015, £1.6 million was spent on political advertising through Facebook and Google alone.118 
This figure was double the amount spent on campaign broadcasts and five times that spent on 
newspapers. This advertising was largely unregulated as the ASA does not regulate political 
advertising.119 Following the 1997 election, the ASA avoided any regulatory oversight of 
political advertising, arguing that it might damage the advertising industry’s self-regulatory 
system if it were seen to have been deployed with bias toward one party.120 
As a result, we have a regulatory anomaly. Political advertising is prohibited on legacy 
media outlets. Fixing this requires updating electoral law for the digital era and requires inter-
agency and institutional cooperation. These rules should be designed to also protect and inform 
voters. Unlike other advertisers that have self-interest in preserving the trustworthiness of their 
brand through accurate advertising, social media platforms do not. Furthermore, an ‘offline’ 
commercial ad reflects a business’s interest. An ‘online’ advertisement is designed to drive 
traffic to an external website with the ‘landing page’ only approved for satisfaction with a) 
technical requirements and b) an overview of the content. Facebook uses both human and 
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automated processes ‘to make sure that they meet our Advertising Policies’ for political 
advertising.121 This follows the industry standard approach for self-regulation among 
commercial advertisers that have normally operated in ‘offline’ environments traditionally 
constrained by good business practices and the CAP Code, and brings political advertising into 
the realm of regulation and licensing.122 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, political advertising should be overseen by a co-
regulatory arrangement between Ofcom and the ASA in a manner that mirrors the existing 
model for the regulation of broadcast advertising. Previous examples of advertising 
associations working in partnership with Ofcom facilitated the contracting of broadcast 
advertising to the ASA. These industry proposals resulted in the Ofcom Code, with the 
regulator retaining the power to amend when deemed appropriate. Due to trust in the industry 
through its own self-regulation, this power has been used rather sparingly. In this proposal, 
Ofcom would have the statutory authority to oversee the licensing of political advertisers, with 
the ASA continuing its self-regulation of the advertising practices. 
Any new political advertising code should be built upon principles of transparency and 
accountability and deploy them in a way that encourages a responsible market for digital 
political advertising. All platforms that sell political advertising should hold a copy of the ad 
in a public repository alongside metadata about the ad. Not only will marketing transparency 
increase accountability, the creation of a repository will stimulate economic growth by creating 
markets for competing campaigns. All public repositories should be downloadable in machine 
readable language and contain such information including, but not limited to ownership, the 
landing page associated with the ad, how long the ad was visible, any interactions with the ad 
etc. Metadata should be held in a searchable publicly accessible interface. This obligation 
should be independent of any current data protection legislation and would ensure 
accountability and scrutiny for all political advertising visible on users’ pages. 
The transparency principle ensures users have the right to access information about who 
has targeted them and by what means. Access to machine readable data about targeted 
advertisements would help voters compare and contrast the validity of the idea directed at them, 
ensuring the possibility of plurality in thinking rather than subservience to who has the best 
profiling technology in a given election cycle. Licensing ensures not only transparency in 
advertisement but transparency in the actors behind profiling and data analytics. This market-
friendly approach does not restrict markets but ensures transparency and accountability across 
the advertising eco-system. Platforms should be legally prohibited from permitting 
advertisements during restricted periods from non-licensed advertisers. This reflects a hybrid 
approach that mirrors regulating political advertising in the ‘offline’ world while preserving 
the integrity of the electoral process within human rights frameworks that permit restrictions 




Attempts to regulate private propaganda can be traced back to the League of Nations and 
preliminary deliberations for the UN Charter. Ideological divides on either side of the Iron 
Curtain frustrated third-world countries wishing to have some say over the influence others 
exerted over their sovereignty through the use of propaganda. The West’s ‘marketplace of 
ideas’ won at the expense of the Soviet-favoured approach of having media controlled and 
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heavily regulated by the state. For 60 years, this status quo served both sides well, especially 
when print media and broadcasting were the primary, if not the sole systems for disseminating 
content. However, advances in digital technologies have broadened the methods available for 
dissemination and added efficiencies to mass advertising. Psychometric profiling and A/B 
testing can measure user responses to stimuli and can help target propaganda without any 
corrections or the counterbalance that the marketplace of ideas normally provides. 
Regulators have responded by emphasising the role of the EU’s data protection regime 
to control the dissemination of computational propaganda. Many of the methods discussed 
above require the analysis of personal data and automated processes; however, the GDPR 
prohibits the processing of personal data through a list of prohibitive grounds. However, once 
a data controller satisfies certain conditions, systematic psychometric profiling and targeting 
propaganda can theoretically take place. Even if national data protection agencies find a way 
to raise the threshold of consent to such a level that it is virtually impossible, demographic-
based advertising would still be permitted. As much of computational propaganda is delivered 
through advertising-based content, and Facebook’s delivery system makes the platform an 
advertising publisher, the legal justification for regulating the actor and political advertising 
content is satisfied. At user level, the marketplace of ideas should be permitted to flow and 
operate as normal. At system level, processes associated with using personal data to target and 
deliver computational propaganda should be regulated. Finally, to ensure the appropriateness 
of material targeted at voters, proper advertising regulation is needed at content level.  
